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From 1870 to 1913, the Portuguese economy expanded slowly and diverged from the 
European core. Contrarily, in the interwar period, Portugal achieved higher growth and 
partially caught-up to the levels of productivity of Western Europe. Higher growth in 
Portugal  after  World  War  I  occurred  in  a  framework  of  protection,  increasing  state 
intervention,  and  capital  deepening.  Agriculture  responded  more  positively  than 
manufacturing, revealing important changes in its structure which favored output with 
higher levels of factor productivity. Portugal’s pattern of growth across 1870-1950 was 
not  unique  within  the  European  periphery,  but  it  contrasted  with  Latin  America’s 
experience.  
 





Entre 1870 e 1913, a economia portuguesa cresceu lentamente e divergiu do centro da 
Europa. Ao contrário, durante o período de entre as duas guerras mundiais, Portugal 
atingiu taxas de crescimento económico mais elevadas e convergiu parcialmente para os 
níveis de produtividade da Europa ocidental. O crescimento mais rápido verificado a 
seguir  à  primeira  Guerra  Mundial  deu-se  num  contexto  proteccionista,  de  crescente 
intervenção do Estado e também de intensificação do investimento. O sector agrário 
respondeu de forma mais positiva do que o sector manufactureiro, revelando alterações 
significativas na estrutura da produção da agricultura, em favor de produções com níveis 
mais elevados de produtividade dos factores. O padrão de crescimento em Portugal, 
durante o período entre 1870 e 1950, não foi único no contexto da periferia europeia, 
mas contrastou com a experiência dos países da América Latina.  
 




                                                            
* Previous versions of this paper were presented at seminars at the universities of Durham (UK), Oporto 
(CEMPRE, Economics Faculty), and Zaragoza. I would like to thank comments from participants. The 
usual caveat applies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A better understanding of the causes of European economic growth has much to gain 
from  the  knowledge  of  the  experiences  of  falling  behind  and  catching  up  of  the 
Continent’s poor periphery. Theories on the causes of rapid industrialization have to be 
validated by investigating why peripheral countries remained behind during most of the 
nineteenth century and why that changed during the twentieth century. In a few number 
of  peripheral  countries  rapid  growth  and  catching  up  was  first  achieved  during  the 
interwar period, as a prelude to the period of higher growth during the golden age.
1 That 
was the case of Portugal. 
From 1870 to 1913, Portugal failed to get closer to the levels of income per capita and 
labor productivity of the forerunners, despite the fact that it was increasingly involved in 
the  international  economy.  Between  1913  and  1950,  Portugal’s  growth  experience 
changed in a remarkable way. Its rate of economic growth increased and, for the first 
time since industrialization began, the gap to the European core was partially abridged 
(though part of the recovery was due to the slowing down of economic growth in the 
European core after 1929). Thus, the Portuguese economy expanded slowly when more 
favorable  external  conditions  developed,  and  expanded  more  rapidly  when  the 
international economic conditions were less favorable, after World War I.
2 This paper 
explores the causes of such paradox. 
Portugal’s growth paradox was not unique within the European periphery. But growth 
experiences elsewhere were more limited in time because of political instability and 
civil war. In Greece and Yugoslavia, the period of higher growth following World War I 
was  interrupted  by  instability  in  Central  Europe,  particularly  in  their  main  trading 
partners on the West, Germany and Austria, following the 1931 bank crisis. Spain had 
an acceleration of growth after World War I which was interrupted by the emergence of 
                                                            
1 See Maddison (1995), Good and Ma (1999) and Lains (2003a). For Greece see Kostelenos (1995) and 
Christodoulaki (2001). Bulgaria and Turkey also caught-up in the period from the early 1920s to the 
beginning of World War II, whereas Latin America diverged. See Pamuk (2001) and Taylor (1998). See 
also Milanovic (2003). 
2 According to Clemens and Williamson (2001), tariffs were positively correlated with growth in the 
nineteenth century (1865-1908) and during the interwar period (1919-1934). See also Bairoch (1976), 
O’Rourke (2000) and Vamvakidis (2002).   
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civil war in 1936.
3 The impact of the Great Depression in Italy was in the midway 
between industrialized and peripheral Europe.
4 
Yet  the  growth  experience  of  the  poor  periphery  of  Europe  contrasts  with  what 
happened in other parts of the World and, in particular, in higher income Latin America 
countries,  such  as  Argentina.
5  There  economic  growth  was  generally  higher  before 
World War I and the region benefited largely from immigration, capital imports and 
exports to the European and the North American markets. After the War and even more 
so after the Great Depression, Latin America entered a period of slower growth and 
falling behind, as a consequence of the contraction in international economic relations. 
6 
The contrast between the European and the Latina American peripheries is a further 
paradox of the interwar period. According to Williamson (2002a) tariffs have positive 
long-run effects, if there is a ‘big domestic market’ and if a given country ‘is ready for 
industrialization, accumulation and human capital deepening’.
7 However, in the early 
twentieth century, Argentina was closer to that description and the outcome of higher 
protection and state intervention was apparently less favorable than it was in Portugal. 
The causes of the Latin American depression in the interwar period can be related to 
changes in tariff policy, although the shift to higher protection was less important than 
previously  believed.
8  But  they  are  also  related  to  other  factors,  such  as  the  sharp 
contraction of capital imports, after 1914, and the low domestic savings rate of the 
population  with  a  large  proportion  of  young  immigrants.
9  Hadass  and  Williamson 
(2003) also sustain that one of the possible causes of the Latin American falling behind 
during the interwar period was a ‘resource course’ associated with capital flight and rent 
seeking in their economies. As we contend in the paper, capital imports into Portugal 
                                                            
3 See Palafox (1991), Carreras (1995), Prados and Sanz (1996) and Prados (2003). 
4 See Rossi and Toniolo (1992), Mattesini and Quintieri (1997) and Perri and Quadrini (2002). See also 
Madsen (2001a). 
5 See Taylor (1992). Taylor and Williamson (1997) argue that factor mobility had a higher impact on 
wage convergence than did trade. 
6 See Williamson (2002a and 2002b). 
7 See also Eichengreen (1992). 
8 For the evolution of the levels of Latin American trade protection before and after 1913, see Blattman et 
al. (2002), Clemens and Williamson (2001) and Hadass and Williamson (2003). For the analysis of the 
divergence  of  Latin  America,  see  Williamson  (2002b).  Madsen  (2001b)  estimates  that  higher  trade 
barriers accounted for about half of the reduction of total trade among 17 countries, representing world 
trade, in the interwar period. Estevadeordal et al.(2003) argue that the main causes of the depression of 
world trade in the interwar period were higher transport costs and the collapse of the gold standard. See 
also Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000). 
9 See Taylor (1992 and 1998). See also Eichengreen (1992).  
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increased  after  the  War,  as  did  the  domestic  savings  rate.  The  understanding  of 
comparatively better performance of the European periphery may have more to do with 
what happened in the capital markets than with the effects of protection.
10 
The change in the pattern of economic growth in the poor European periphery in the 
period between the wars has deserved little attention in the literature and it has still not 
held  enough  recognition.  Its  understanding  is  most  relevant  for  the  discussion  of 
explanatory models of European economic growth, as it contributes to the study of the 
effects of different levels of openness and state intervention on the growth of the less 
industrialized economies, as well as the effects in changes in capital flows.  
The paper is structured as follows. Next section sets down the main features of the 
Portuguese economy and discusses the impact of the War and the stabilization program 
that  followed.  The  third  section  discusses  the  main  trends  in  economic  growth  and 
structural  change  in  the  period  from  1870  to  1950.  The  fourth  section analyses the 
growth  of  factor  productivity  in  agriculture  and  industry.  The  fifth  section  explains 
Portugal’s growth performance in terms of productivity gains in the agrarian sector. The 
paper ends with a concluding section. 
BACKWARDNESS IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I 
By mid-nineteenth century, Portugal was an extremely backward country, as its income 
per capita laid well behind most of the other Western European countries, including 
Scandinavia.
11 Such high level of backwardness is evident in many aspects. There were 
large parts of the territory which were not cultivated, despite the fact that the labor force 
was to a large proportion still employed in the agricultural sector. The share of animal 
products  in  total  agrarian  production  was  relatively  small.  Such  feature  implied  a 
deficient use of natural manure and animal force, which were of course not substituted 
by chemical fertilizers until late in the nineteenth century and machinery well into the 
twentieth century.
12 In industry there was a predominance of traditional activities and 
mechanization and the use of coal or other sources of power was still relatively scarce.
13 
                                                            
10 See Estevadeordal et al.(2003). See also Prados (2003, pp. 158-59). 
11 ‘Extreme backwardness’ is here used in the sense introduced by Gerschenkron (1962), referring to a 
level of development below the threshold of the converging countries. See also Abramovitz (1986) and 
the discussion in Lains (2002). For relative income levels in Europe, see also Maddison (1995) and Reis 
(2000). 
12 See Reis (1993). 
13 See Justino (1988-1989) and Pedreira (1990).  
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The  transport  sector  was  also  poorly  developed,  with  bad  roads,  few  ports  and  no 
relevant canals.
14 The society at large also had many signs of serious underdevelopment. 
The state was relatively inefficient, constrained by political instability and scarce of 
financial resources and that translated into a deficient coverage of the territory and low 
levels of investment in infrastructure and education.
15  
Portugal’s extreme backwardness was only partially overcome in the years from 1850 to 
1913, but some progress was achieved. Firstly, the industrial sector expanded at about 
2.5 percent per year and the agricultural sector at about 1.5 percent and thus the country 
became  more  industrialized,  albeit  at  a  relatively  slow  pace.
16  There  were  also 
significant productivity gains in the agricultural sector. Other facets of change in the 
Portuguese economy include changes in the structure of both the agricultural and the 
industrial sector. In agriculture, a major transformation concerned the increase in the 
area under acreage at the expense of the decline in the uncultivated area or the area left 
under fallow. This was a major source of the increase in labor productivity as more land 
was put into use.
17  Contrarily, there were no relevant  changes in the levels of land 
productivity, as the introduction of new processes and techniques in agriculture was 
relatively slow. In the industrial sector, there were also some relevant productivity gains 
and changes in structure, which were associated with higher levels of protection. Due to 
highly protective tariffs, both in the domestic and the colonial markets, at the outbreak 
of the War, Portugal had a relatively large share of its industrial labor force occupied in 
the textile sector, which was relatively inefficient.
18  
Despite tariff protection, the degree of internationalization of the Portuguese economy 
increased in important ways after 1870, as foreign trade, capital imports and emigration 
expanded  faster  than  the  rest  of  economy.  These  trends  were  not  sustained  though. 
Following the abandonment of the gold standard in 1891 and the partial default from the 
state in the following year, capital imports declined.
19 Export also expanded at slower 
pace in the last two decades before the war, as Portugal did not manage to keep her 
quotas in the markets for agricultural products, such as wine and live animals, due to the 
                                                            
14 See Justino (1988-89). 
15 Reis (1993). 
16 See Lains (1995). 
17 See Lains (2003b). 
18 See Lains (1995). 
19 See Mata (1993) and Esteves (2003).  
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competition from Mediterranean and South American exporters.
20  
The slow pace of economic growth in the decades up to 1913 went together with the 
slow development of institutions and infrastructures. Yet the control of the State over 
the  territory  was  universally  achieved  by  the  eve  of  the  War.  Mortality  fell  and 
urbanization  and  literacy  rates  increased  in  significant  ways.
21  The  financial  system 
became  more  developed  and  widespread.
22  And  there  was  an  important  effort  in 
building  railways,  roads  and  other  infrastructures.  Such  developments  were  made 
possible by increasing government deficit and public debt, which was financed either 
domestically or in the international capital markets.
23  
Despite such positive economic and institutional developments, the fact is that Portugal 
failed to catch-up to the levels of income per capita of the forerunners.
24 But half a 
century of slow but sustained growth led the Portuguese economy to a higher degree of 
maturity, which proved to be fundamental for the kind of response to the distresses 
provoked by World War I. The war was highly disruptive for the Portuguese economy, 
in spite of the fact that the country had only a minor participation and that its territory 
was not directly affected by warfare. In 1916, Portugal entered the war on the allied side 
and the first immediate consequence was an increase in public expenditure and in the 
government deficit, which led to an increase in money supply and inflation.
25 The war 
also provoked the decline in exports from Portugal and reexports from the colonies, 
whereas imports maintained its upward trend. Emigrant remittances declined too and the 
financing of the country’s balance of payments was severely affected.  
The participation in the war was compensated by a loan from the British government 
which temporarily eased the external and the government financial disequilibria.
26 But 
that  was  not  sufficient  and,  as  state  revenues  did  not  keep  up  with  expenses,  the 
government kept printing money and prices continued to rise sharply. Of all countries 
which territory was not affected by warfare, Portugal was the one with highest inflation 
                                                            
20 See Lains (2003c, chap. 2) 
21 See Reis (1993). 
22 See Reis (1995). 
23 See Mata (1993) and Esteves (2003).  
24 None of the European countries with levels of income per capita close to Portugal’s in around 1870 
caught up in the period to 1913. See Good and Ma (1999) and Lains (2002). 
25 On the interwar period see Valério (1994), Carvalho (2001) and Lains (2003c, chap. 5). 
26 Valério (1994).  
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levels and devaluation.
27  
After the War, several measures were taken in order for the government to gain more 
leverage over the economy, as was happening contemporarily in the rest of the European 
continent. That change occurred firstly has a response to the effects of the War in the 
supplies  of  energy,  raw  materials,  and  main  food  staples,  in  order  to  minor  food 
shortages and to keep  on working the industries which depended on the imports of 
energy and other industrial inputs. The interwar period was also marked by a high level 
of  political  instability  which  lasted  throughout  the  whole  period  of  the  Republican 
regime (1910-1926) and during the first years of the dictatorship imposed in 1926. 
Stabilization  is  often  associated  with  the  dictatorship  imposed  by  the  1926  military 
coup, that would lead to the ascension of Salazar, first as finance minister, in 1928, and 
then prime minister, in 1932. However, it should be noted that stabilization was clearly 
achieved from 1924 and that the two first years of the dictatorship, 1926-1928 had a 
negative impact on the main financial and monetary variables.
28  Moreover, military 
uprisings, general social unrest and strikes marked Portugal’s political life until well 
into the 1930s and it only stopped thanks to the repression and the limitation of political 
rights imposed by the dictatorship.
29 
The redressing of the Portuguese finance and monetary variables was achieved though a 
mix of improved conditions in the foreign markets, change in monetary policies, fiscal 
reform, and the rise of tariffs and other import controls.
30 Such measures were of course 
made possible by political stabilization and also by the return of at least one of the 
classical sources of external financing, namely, emigrant remittances. In 1922 and 1923, 
respectively,  a  fiscal  and  a  tariff  reform  were  implemented.  Both  reforms  aimed  to 
restore government taxes which had been eroded by the inflation, as most tariffs were 
specific and not ad  valorem. In 1924, a foreign reserve fund was introduced which 
retained 50 percent of the earnings in gold and foreign reserves from exporters and there 
was an important sale of silver coin reserves by Banco de Portugal. In 1925, a new bank 
imposed stricter measures for the sector and defined the role of Banco de Portugal as 
strictly one of central bank with higher control by the government. The new balances 
                                                            
27 See Feinstein et al. (1997). 
28 See Valério (1994). 
29 See Pinto (Ed.) (1998) and Gomes and Tavares (1999). 
30 For further details on the stabilization policies, see Valério (1994), Carvalho (2001) and Lains (2003c, 
chap. 5).  
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were also made possible by the negotiations of the war debt to Great Britain which was 
virtually cancelled in 1926. One further major help in reaching the new equilibrium was 
the return of domestic capital that had flown the country during the War, which was 
estimated  at  60  to  70  million  pound  sterling,  accumulated  in  1929,  and  should  be 
compared to an estimate of British investment in Portugal of 21-25 million pounds and 
exports which totaled 10 million pounds, also in 1929.
31  
After two years of political instability, in 1928, Salazar as finance minister enhanced the 
measures that had been taken up to then. He refused a loan from the League of Nations, 
which had been painfully negotiated by the finance minister before him. There were also 
some war compensations and a severe cut in expenses with the colonies, which were to 
end totally in 1930. In 1929, final steps were made to redress the state finances by 
increasing further tariff levels. After peaking at 30 percent of GDP, in 1924, the import 
share declined to 18 percent of GDP, in 1929, and that level that was kept roughly 
constant up to 1945. The share of exports in GDP also remained relatively constant 
throughout. 
Table 1 provides the data on the evolution of Portugal’s main fundamentals. It depicts 
the high rates of price inflation and exchange devaluation which started off during the 
War and were aggravated in the post-war period. At an annual rate of 58.8 percent, 
between 1914 and 1918,  Portugal  had the highest war  inflation  in Western Europe, 
surpassed only by Italy, Finland and the hyperinflation in Germany and Austria. During 
the following period from 1918 to 1924 Portugal remained at the top of the inflation 
league in Europe. The depreciation of the exchange rate followed closely the inflation 
pattern, because the escudo was left to float. Table 1 also shows the growth of the 
money supply, total public debt and the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP. In all cases 
there was a considerable expansion, as compared to the pre-war levels and in all cases 
there was a sharp reduction in the years between 1924 and the outbreak of World War II. 
Table 2 shows the evolution of tariff protection and trade ratios and points to the fact 
that protection was more effective after 1929. 
 
                                                            
31 Lains (2003c, pp. 160-162).  
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Table 1 - Monetary and fiscal indicators for Portugal, 1854-1945 














% of GDP 
1854-1891    0.39  3.23  0.00 
(1)  5.12  1.5 
1891-1914    0.92  0.68  0.69  0.46  0.3 
1914-1918    58.81  21.37  8.68  11.29  6.8 
1918-1924    30.84  37.68  60.28  41.70  8.7 
1924-1929    -3.33  5.20  -4.17  3.48  3.3 
1929-1939    -0.10  6.21  1.85  -2.84  -0.9 
1939-1945    15.22  27.77  -1.58  5.54  0.9 
(1) Portugal was on the Gold Standard from 1854 to 1891. 
Sources: GDP deflator: Lains (2003c, appendix); Money supply (M1): Valério (Ed.) (2001, pp. 568-71) (for a discussion of 
different series for the period to 1912, see pp. 544-45); Exchange rate: Valério (Ed.) (2001, p. 737);  
Total public debt: Valério (Ed.) (2001, pp. 707-10); Budget deficit: Mata and Valério (1996, p. 205). 
Table 2 - Trade ratios and average tariffs (percent) 








  Value  Volume  Value  Volume  Value  Volume  Value  Volume 
1910-1913  22.9  --  9.0  11.4  19.4  7.5  28.4  18.9 
1918-1928  8.0  19.6  8.4  11.3  24.9  9.8  33.3  21.1 
1929-1937  27.9  47.4  6.6  8.7  14.7  12.3  21.3  21.0 
1938-1950  16.3  19.1  11.5  9.6  16.3  15.0  27.8  24.6 
Notes: Average tariffs are the ratio of total tariff revenues to total imports. Shares in volume were computed by deflating values 
respectively by the price indices for GDP, exports (X) and imports (M). Tariffs were deflated by the GDP price index. 
Sources: Computed from Batista et al. (1997). 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE: TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK 
The main phases of growth of Portuguese income per capita during the century to about 
1950 are given in Table 3, which shows trends growth rates defined between peak years 
(see also figure 1).
32 The data shows that in the first phase from 1855 to 1870 there was 
a substantial decline in income per capita, as the economy shrank at –0.74 percent per 
year. The decline may be exaggerated, as we cannot be sure whether 1855 is an absolute 
peak, for lack of data for the previous years. Yet it is well established that this was a 
period of decline in agricultural output, particularly due to the fall of wine output as a 
consequence of the spread of disease in the vines. Portugal was a highly agricultural 
economy, in which wine accounted for about 1/3 of the total agrarian output, and thus 
economic  growth  was  much  sensitive  to  changes  in  climacteric  or  other  natural 
                                                            
32 For a discussion of GDP data, see Lains (2003c, appendix).  
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conditions.
33  Growth  of  income  per  capita  resumed  after  1870  but  in  a  first  phase 
income expanded only moderately. From 1882 to the end of the nineteenth century, the 
pace of economic growth increased. According to the data on Table 3, most of the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century was spent in recovering economic decline in the 1850s 
and the 1860s.  
During the first decade of the twentieth century, agriculture had again a negative phase, 
which partially offset the positive performance of the industrial sector. In sharp contrast 
with what happened in agriculture, industrial output expanded at relatively stable rates 
of growth throughout the decades from 1870 onwards and showing some tendency to 
rise at the end of the century. The year 1922 marked an important turning point in 
Portugal’s growth experience, as income per capita expanded since then at rates which 
had not been seen before. In the years after 1922, growth was common to the three 
sectors of the economy and in some periods there was a small increase in the share of 
agriculture in national output. There was a slight slowing down after 1934, but growth 
resumed at a faster pace after 1947.  
 
Table 3 – Growth of real income per 
capita in Portugal, 1851-1958 
(peak-to-peak annual growth rates; percent) 
1855-1870  -0.74 
1870-1882  0.44 
1882-1902  0.90 
1902-1922  0.69 
1922-1934  1.56 
1934-1947  1.13 
1947-1958  2.14 
Trend (1851-1958)  0.86 
Note: Peak years (1855 and 1958 excepted) are derived 
from a log-linear time trend for 1851-1958. 
Source: Lains (2003c, appendix). 
 
































































































Table 4 compares the growth of Portugal’s GDP per capita with growth in the three 
European peripheral and an average for nine European core countries, during what can 
be  termed  the  Maddison’s  phases  of  economic  growth.  The  table  shows  that  the 
performance of the Portuguese economy was relatively poor during the first two phases 
down  to  1913.  During  the  period  from  1913  to  1929, Portugal’s  income per capita 
                                                            
33 See for agricultural growth Justino (1988-1989) and Lains (1995).  
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growth rate increased, although it performed worst than Spain and Greece. Yet, Portugal 
kept on growing after 1929, contrarily to Spain, which was affected by the civil war 
(1936-1939). After 1938, Portugal’s growth performance was also better than that of 
Greece and that can be explained by the fact that Greece which was directly affected by 
World War II which was followed by civil war. As a result, Portugal performed better 
than the rest of the peripheral countries shown in the table when the whole 1913-1950 
period is considered.
34  
Table 4 - Growth of real income per capita in the European periphery, 1870-1950 
(Maddison’s phases of development; annual growth rates between 3-years averages; percent) 
  Portugal  Spain  Greece  Ireland  Average 9 
1870-1890  0.66  1.48  -  1.21  1.07 
1890-1913  0.40  0.76  -  0.84  1.32 
1913-1929  1.35  1.65  2.45  0.33  1.39 
1929-1938  1.28  -3.53  1.50  0.87  1.16 
1938-1950  1.56  1.48  -2.72  0.94  1.00 
1870-1913  0.52  1.09  0.54  1.01  1.21 
1913-1950  1.40  0.31  0.51  0.66  1.21 
1870-1950  0.93  0.73  0.53  0.85  1.21 
Notes: ‘Average 9’ is based on an unweighted average index for the following European core countries, from Maddison: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and UK. Three year averages, except for 1870/71 and for Spain 
(1870 and 1890), Ireland (1870, 1890 and 1913). 
Sources: Maddison (1995 and 2001), Lains (2002), for Greece in 1870-1913 and Lains (2003c, appendix) for Portugal. 
 
Table 5 - Convergence of real incomes per capita in the European periphery, 1870-1950 
(Maddison’s phases of development; annual growth rates between 3-years averages; percent) 
  Portugal  Spain  Greece  Ireland 
1870-1890  -0.41  0.41  -  0.14 
1890-1913  -0.92  -0.56  -  -0.48 
1913-1929  -0.04  0.26  1.04  -1.04 
1929-1938  0.12  -4.64  0.33  -0.29 
1938-1950  0.55  0.47  -3.69  -0.06 
1870-1913  -0.68  -0.11  -0.66  -0.19 
1913-1950  0.19  -0.89  -0.69  -0.54 
1870-1950  -0.28  -0.47  -0.64  -0.35 
Notes: convergence defined according to:  
f    =  [(y i / y9) ( t + 1)  / (y i / y9) ( t ) ] 
[ 1 /  ( t +1  - t )  ] 
where y i is income per capita for the 4 countries in the table and y9 is the average for the United Kingdom,  
France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands Italy, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 
Sources: see Table 4. 
                                                            
34 See Lains (2003a).  
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Table 5 tells the same story, based on estimates for GDP per capita rates of convergence 
towards the European core. As it is shown, Portugal diverged in 1870-1890, at –0.41 
percent per year, and even more in 1890-1913, at –0.92 percent per year. It is interesting 
to note that divergence after 1890 was more important in Portugal and that it occurred in 
Spain and Ireland, contrarily to what have happened in these countries in the period 
before 1890. In the case of Portugal, there was a slight divergence during 1913-1929, 
but  after  the New York crash,  Portugal  start  converging for the first time, again  in 
marked contrast to what was happening in the rest of the countries of the European 
periphery shown in the table. Catching-up was helped by the reduction of growth in the 
European core after 1929. 
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of Portuguese GDP per capita to the average of the nine 
European core countries declined quite sharply, between 1870 and 1875, from 50 to 45 
percent, stabilized in the years up to 1890, declined only slightly to 1900, and then 
sharply again to 1915. From then on, the ratio evolved in an irregular way but with a 
positive trend to at least 1947. However, in this year, Portugal’s relative position was 
still below the one that existed in 1870.  
Figure 2 - 







1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
 
Source: see Table 1 
The observed pattern of growth of income per capita can be related to changes in the 
structure  of  the  economy  before  we  turn  to  the  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  factor 
productivity. Data on the evolution of the structure  of the output of the Portuguese 
economy during the century from 1850 to 1950 is presented in Table 6. The data is 
based on direct evaluation of output at 1958 prices for the period from 1910 to 1950. 
For the previous period, we use backward extrapolations of the structure in 1910, based 
on indices for physical output growth and a proxy index for the growth of services. As  
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shown  there,  Portugal  had  in  the  beginning  of  the  period  a  small  level  of 
industrialization, as the industrial sector accounted for only 13 percent of total output, 
whereas  the  agricultural  sector  accounted  for  about  45  percent.  The  share  of  the 
agricultural sector in GDP declined from 45.4 percent of total output, in 1850, to 36.4 
percent, in 1880, to increase in the following two decades. Such evolution of the weight 
of the agricultural sector is closely related to trends in the growth of output. In fact, the 
decline of the agricultural output share down to 1860 happened in a decade of severe 
contraction of output, whereas the recovery of the share between 1880 and 1910 was 
associated to the expansion of output. Portuguese economic growth had to be somehow 
related to the performance of its largest sector, agriculture, but the fact that economic 
growth could be driven by an increasing participation of the agricultural sector has to be 
explained. By 1910, the share of agricultural output in total output had reached the level 
it had thirty years previously, and from 1920 to 1950 the agricultural share remained 
virtually constant.
35 The largest increase in the share of the industrial sector occurred 
between 1850 and 1860, from 13 to 18 percent, and then it took five decades to reach a 
level of 27 percent. After 1910 the share of the industrial sector remained relatively 
stable, increasing only in the decade from 1940 to 1950. 
Table 6 – Evolution and composition of GDP, 1850-1950 
  GDP  Agriculture   Industry  Services 
  000 contos 
1958 prices  Percent 
1850  9,340  45.4  13.1  [41.5] 
1860  9,821  36.8  18.2  [45.0] 
1870  10,958  37.6  17.1  [45.3] 
1880  11,498  36.4  18.9  [44.7] 
1890  13,727  41.5  21.7  [36.8] 
1900  16,073  41.5  24.9  [33.6] 
1910  18,267  36.6  27.1  36.2 
1920  18,809  31.0  26.0  43.0 
1930  27,387  33.1  27.4  39.6 
1940  32,858  33.0  27.8  39.2 
1950  44,800  32.0  30.7  37.3 
Notes: The years in table refer to the centre of three-year averages, except for 1910/11.  
1 conto = 1,000$000 (1 million reis). 
Source: Lains (2003c, Appendix). 
                                                            
35 For the period before 1910, these shares are only indicative, as they were estimated by extrapolating 
backwards output data for 1910 and the growth of the services sector was taken as the growth of active 
population in the sector. See Lains (2003, appendix).  
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The evolution of labor force and of its structure can only be assessed indirectly due to 
lack of data. Table 7 sets down data the available data on total population, population in 
the 15-64 years bracket and active population. The data on active labor force provide 
from the census since 1890 is not plausible, as it implies that the size of male active 
population  is  larger  than  the  size  of  the  15-64  years  bracket.  More  importantly,  it 
implies a substantial contraction in total labor participation rates, from 50.1 percent in 
1890 to 37.9 percent in 1950, and a once and for all decline of 10 percentage points 
between 1910 and 1930. As such, we opted to use as a proxy for the evolution of labor 
force the evolution of males in the 15-64 years bracket, which implies that we assume 
that labor participation rates remained stable throughout the period. This assumption 
affects to a relevant extent only the evolution of labor force during 1910-1930 and that 
should be taken into account in the interpretation of the results. But our option has two 
advantages. Firstly, it implies that we can have a coherent data for active population also 
for those censuses which did not provide that information, namely, 1864, 1878 and 
1920. Secondly, it depicts a growth of active population in line with estimates based on 
a model for interpolation of active population between census years.
36 According to that 
data, there was a gradual decline in the expansion of the total labor force all the way to 
1920,  although  in  this  latter  decade  the  reduction  in  the  rate  of  growth  was  more 
important. After 1920, however, labor force expanded more rapidly, what was due to the 
contraction in emigration after that year. Table 8 shows the shares of total labor force in 
the  three  sectors  based  on  the  structure  of  active  population  given  by  two  parish 
censuses for 1841, 1862, and the official population census for 1890, 1900, 1910, 1930, 
1940 and 1950. The structure for the intermediate census years is estimated by linear 
interpolation.
37  
                                                            
36 See Valério (Ed.) (2001, chap. 4).  
37 See for the parish censuses, Reis (forthcoming).  
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15-64 years as  
% of total  
population 
Active as  
% of total 
population 
Active as  
% of  
15-64 years 
  Total  Males  Total  Males  Total  Males  Total  Males 
1864  4,188  2,006  61.3  59.3  --  --  --  -- 
1878  4,551  2,176  61.4  59.7  --  --  --  -- 
1890  5,050  2,430  60.5  58.9  50.1  66.2  82.8  112.4 
1900  5,423  2,592  60.3  58.7  45.3  66.6  75.1  113.4 
1911  5,960  2,829  59.6  57.6  42.7  65.3  71.7  113.4 
1920  6,033  2,856  61.0  59.2  40.2  --  65.9  -- 
1930  6,826  3,256  61.7  60.4  36.9  56.0  59.8  92.7 
1940  7,722  3,712  61.3  60.4  35.9  57.7  58.7  95.6 
1950  8,441  4,060  63.5  63.1  37.9  60.9  59.6  96.5 
Sources: Valério (Ed.) (2001, pp. 51, 55-56, 164 and 178) and Mitchell (1996, table A2). 
Table 8 – Evolution and sectorial distribution of male labor force, 1841-1950 
 
Total Male 
Labor Force Agriculture  Industry  Services 
  (000)  Percent 
1841  993  67.5  15.9  16.6 
1862  1,161  65.9  15.5  18.5 
1864  1,189  [66.0]  [15.7]  [18.2] 
1878  1,298  [66.6]  [17.0]  [16.3] 
1890  1,432  66.9  18.3  14.8 
1900  1,522  66.4  18.8  14.8 
1911  1,629  61.0  21.7  17.3 
1920  1,691  [60.9]  [21.2]  [17.9] 
1930  1,967  60.9  20.7  18.4 
1940  2,241  57.8  21.0  21.1 
1950  2,562  53.8  24.6  21.6 
Notes and sources: Total males in the 15-64 brackets computed from table 7, except for 1841 and 1862 which are based on growth 
rates for labour force to 1890 from Reis (forthcoming). Shares from Reis (forthcoming) (for 1841 and 1862) and from Valério (Ed.) 
(2001, p. 164) (for 1890 to 1950, except for 1864, 1878 and 1920, which are linear interpolations from adjoining years). 
The  comparison  of Portugal’s  structural change patterns with that of other southern 
European countries reveals a precocious industrialization. In 1860, agricultural output in 
Portugal accounted for 36.8 percent of total domestic output, whereas in Spain and Italy 
the agricultural shares were higher, namely, 39.6 and 46.1 percent. In the five decades to 
1910,  the  relative  size  of  agriculture  in  the  three  southern  European  countries 
converged. After 1920, they diverged once more, as Portugal’s share remained relatively 
flat,  whereas  the  Italian  and  Spanish  shares  declined.  Structural  transformation  in 
Portugal was thus slower than in Spain and Italy and it did not follow a consistent 
pattern.
38  
Table 9 compares Portugal’s agricultural share at different levels of GDP per capita, 
with the norm for 17 countries, for late developers in nineteenth century Europe, as well 
as for 101 countries in the 1950-1970 period. This comparison helps describing the 
                                                            
38 See Mitchell (1996, tab. J2), Molinas and Prados (1989) and Zamagni (1993, tab. 0.7).   
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extent  to  which  Portugal’s  structural  transformation  was  somehow  related  to  the 
country’s relative level of economic development and it shows that it was not.
39 In fact, 
in 1910, Portugal GDP per capita in dollars and prices of 1970 was about US$ 300 and 
the share of agriculture in national output was 36.6 percent. At the same level of income 
per capita, the norm for Europe was 54.2 percent, whereas it was 52.0 percent for the 
less  developed  European  and  46.3  percent  for  the  post-war  World.  In  other  words, 
Portugal had gone slightly further in the reduction of the size of the agricultural sector. 
The fact that the agricultural share in Portugal did not declined to 1930, contrarily to 
what  happened  in  the  three  groups  of  countries  mentioned  above,  implied  some 
convergence of structural change. And after 1930, Portugal’s share converged further to 
that of other countries with the same level of development.  
Table 9 – Portugal’s structural change compared 
Portugal  19
th Century Europe  World, 1950-1970 





AGY  AGLAB  SPG  AGY  AGLAB  SPG  AGY  AGLAB  SPG  AGY  AGLAB  SPG 
  37.6 (1870)  66.3  3.26                   
  41.5 (1890)  66.9  2.85                   
300  36.6 (1910)  61.0  2.71  54.2  72.9  2.27  52.0  69.3  2.08  46.3  66.7  2.32 
400  33.1 (1930)  60.9  3.15  46.5  64.3  2.07  44.1  64.4  2.29  41.3  62.7  2.39 
550  32.0 (1950)  53.8  2.47  38.0  54.6  1.96  35.3  59.0  2.64  34.6  57.3  2.54 
Notes and sources: GDP per capita measured in 1970 US dollars and prices. “World norm” are the values predicted by linear 
regressions for a sample of 101 countries for 1950-70, with income and population as dependent variables and population fixed at 
10 million. See Chenery and Syrquin (1975, table 3). Portugal’s GDP for 1970 is from Bairoch (1981, p. 10) and extrapolated 
backwards following estimates on table 1. Data from Crafts (1984, tabs. 2, 4 and 7). 
AGY = share of agriculture in total output (%); AGLAB = share of agriculture in total labour force (%);  SPG = Sectoral 
productivity gap = (100-AGY) / (100-AGLAB) x AGLAB / AGY. 
Table  9  also  shows  that  the  earlier  structural  transformation  of Portugal’s output is 
matched by a precocious shift of labor resources from agriculture to industry. In fact, at 
$US 300 level of GDP per capita at 1970 prices, Portugal had 61.0 percent of its labor 
force  employed  in  the  agricultural  sector,  whereas  the  nineteenth  century  European 
norm for the same level of income per capita was higher at 69.3 percent, for the late-
developers, or 72.9 percent, for the 17 European countries, whereas the World norm, in 
1950-1970,  was  66.7  percent.  In  1950,  as  GDP  per  capita  amounted  to  $US  550, 
Portugal’s labor share was still below the correspondent European and World norms. 
Thus, the growth of the share of agriculture in national output was accompanied by a 
decline in the share of agricultural labor. This means that the productivity gap between 
                                                            
39 See Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and Molinas and Prados (1989).  
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agriculture and the rest of the economy declined in the period to 1950, converging to the 
level of nineteenth century European late-comers and the World average.  
The fact that the share of Portugal’s agricultural sector in total employment and output 
was  smaller  than  the  average  of  countries  with  similar  levels  of  development  is  a 
consequence of the fact that up until late in the nineteenth century the level of tariff 
protection of industry was higher than that of agriculture.
40 After 1890, protection to 
agriculture was enhanced and agriculture increased its weight in total output and labor 
force. It is important to point though that the increase in the relative importance of the 
agricultural sector, after World War I, was associated with a decline in the growth of 
agrarian  labor  force  and  that  labor  productivity  increased  concomitantly.  Thus,  we 
observe a decline in the sectorial productivity gap in favor of the agricultural sector and 
that  Portugal  converged also in  terms of productivity gaps to the level of the other 
countries at the same level of development. This is also shown in Table 9. Structural 
change after 1920 is associated with changes that put the structure of the Portuguese 
economy in line to the norm of other countries with similar levels of income per capita, 
reversing the precocious shift of resources out of agriculture in the period before World 
War I and, in particular, before 1890.   
Table 10 shows aggregate and disaggregate growth rates for output, labor force and 
labor productivity. Labor productivity in the whole economy expanded faster during 
1880-1900  and  slowed  down  in  the  following  two  decades.  After  1920,  labor 
productivity  gained  momentum  and  despite  the  slowing  down  in  the  1930s,  labor 
productivity expanded more rapidly after the War then before. The productivity of labor 
employed in the agricultural sector in some occasions expanded at a similar pace or 
even more rapidly than that of the industrial sector, as it was the case in the decades 
from 1880-1890 and from 1920-1950. Thus the increasing importance of the agricultural 
sector was clearly associated with a better overall economic growth performance. This 
was so particularly during the 1920s and the 1940s.  
                                                            
40 See Lains (2003c, chap. 3)  
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Table 10 - Growth of output, labour force and labour productivity, 1860-1950 
(annual growth rates, percent) 
  Output 
  Agriculture  Industry  Services  Total 
1860-1880  0.74  0.95  0.70  0.70 
1880-1890  3.14  3.23  0.90  2.21 
1890-1900  1.58  3.00  0.65  1.57 
1900-1910  -0.40  1.97  1.00  0.74 
1910-1920  -1.64  0.15  2.14  0.32 
1920-1930  4.51  4.35  2.97  3.83 
1930-1940  1.81  2.02  1.73  1.84 
1940-1950  2.82  4.16  2.66  3.15 
 
  Labor force 
  Agriculture  Industry  Services  Total 
1860-1880  0.77  1.28  -0.09  0.70 
1880-1890  0.86  1.44  0.01  0.82 
1890-1900  0.54  0.88  0.61  0.61 
1900-1910  -0.15  1.94  2.06  0.62 
1910-1920  0.40  0.16  0.80  0.42 
1920-1930  1.52  1.28  1.80  1.52 
1930-1940  0.78  1.46  2.71  1.31 
1940-1950  0.62  2.96  1.59  1.35 
 
  Labor productivity 
  Agriculture  Industry  Services  Total 
1860-1880  -0.03  -0.33  0.79  0.00 
1880-1890  2.28  1.79  0.89  1.39 
1890-1900  1.04  2.12  0.04  0.96 
1900-1910  -0.25  0.03  -1.06  0.12 
1910-1920  -2.04  -0.01  1.34  -0.10 
1920-1930  2.99  3.07  1.17  2.31 
1930-1940  1.03  0.56  -0.98  0.53 
1940-1950  2.20  1.20  1.07  1.80 
Sources: Output from Lains (2003c, appendix) and labor force from Table 8,  
with linear interpolations. 
BACKWARDNESS AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
In order to explain the increasing contribution of agriculture to Portuguese economic 
growth after World War I we have to go beyond the analysis of labor productivity and 
assess as well the performance of investment. This can be particularly relevant because 
we have noticed that the conditions for domestic investment increased favorably during 
the interwar period as a consequence of the return of domestic capital that had been 
exported at some point before the war. Capital imports were relatively small in size  
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when the War broke out and thus Portugal’s rate on domestic investment presumably 
did not suffer much with the disintegration of the international capital markets in its 
aftermath. The evidence regarding capital flows and domestic investment is very scanty, 
though.  
Table 11 provides a summary of the available data on the growth of factors and factor 
productivity in the agricultural sector and the total economy, based on proxy estimates 
for the growth of capital in the agricultural sector for the century ending in 1950 and for 
the  growth  of  total  capital  in  the  interwar  period.  In  what the agricultural sector is 
concerned, we may see that the growth of labor and capital productivity expanded at 
quite similar rates during 1865-1902. This period of higher growth was followed by one 
of slower growth of labor productivity and decline of capital productivity, to 1927. From 
then on, both productivity growth rates increased again, although the performance of 
labor was better than that of capital. Table 11 also shows that the ratio of capital to labor 
in  agriculture  increased  throughout  the  period  and  that  such  capital  deepening  was 
associated  with  overall  total  factor  productivity  growth.  Total  factor  productivity  in 
agriculture expanded at 1.6 percent per year after 1927 which compares relatively well 
with factor productivity growth elsewhere in Europe.
41 
           Table 11 - Growth labour, capital and total factor productivities, 1910-1950 
                                          (Annual growth rates; percent) 






4 = 3-2 
K/L ratio 
5 = 1-2 
Labor 
Productivity 





Agriculture               
1865-1902  1.41  0.74  0.63  - 0.11  0.67  0.78  0.72 
1902-1927  0.35  0.13  0.86  0.73  0.22  - 0.51  0.20 
1927-1951  2.36  0.97  1.44  0.47  1.39  0.92  1.59 to 1.63 
All Sectors               
1910-1934  2.17  1.00  1.25  0.25  1.17  0.92  0.72 
1934-1947  2.09  1.31  3.89  2.97  0.78  - 1.80  - 0.02 
Sources: Lains (2003a) and (2003b). 
For the aggregate economy we only have data starting in 1910. The lower part of Table 
11 shows that aggregate labor productivity expanded at a faster pace than aggregate 
capital productivity and considerably so after 1934, when there was a marked decline in 
the  productivity  of  capital.  Such  patterns  are  reflected  in  the  growth  of  total  factor 
                                                            
41 See Federico (2000).  
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productivity which virtually stagnated in the period from 1934 to 1947. The ratio of 
capital to the labor force in the aggregate economy expanded rather fast after 1934 and 
that was due mainly to the increase in investment in the non-agricultural sector. By the 
account given here, this implies that capital productivity in the non-agricultural sector 
had a negative performance, particularly after 1934. 
The pattern that emerges from the observation of factor productivity growth is that the 
performance of the agricultural sector was better than that of the non-agricultural sector. 
That outcome helps explaining why the Portuguese economy managed to obtain higher 
productivity  gains  by  shifting  to  a  higher  participation  of  agriculture  in  economic 
growth, during the interwar period. In order to investigate the mechanisms that led to 
such an outcome, we need to look more in depth to the structure of the economy to find 
out how was it that the new capital invested in the agricultural sector had higher levels 
of productivity that capital invested in the rest of the economy.  The data for this in-
depth level of analysis is scant but it is sufficient to reach some further results that 
confirm our overall analysis.  
By  decomposing  the  growth  of  labor  productivity  in  the  growth  of  the  land  per 
agricultural worker and the growth of output per land, we have reached elsewhere the 
conclusion  that  labor  productivity  growth  in  agriculture  was  a  consequence  of  an 
increase  in  land  productivity.
42  In  fact,  before  1930,  the  land-labor  ratio  increased 
slightly or remained stable and output per hectare increased only slightly. After 1930, 
the land-labor ratio declined and yet output per hectare increased at an unprecedented 
pace. Yet this happened without major changes in yields of the main agricultural staples. 
Agrarian productivity growth was achieved by structural shifts within the agricultural 
sector towards production with higher land values and higher labor productivity levels.
43 
Animal output’s share in total agrarian output increased from 23.6 percent in 1900-09 to 
35.9  percent  in  1954-58,  whereas  fruits  and  vegetables  increased  from  6.5  to  12.7 
percent in the same time period. Together, these two sectors accounted for almost half 
of total agrarian output in the 1950s, up from 30 percent in the beginning of the century. 
Structural transformations in Portuguese agriculture can be explained in terms of the 
evolution  of  aggregate  domestic  demand  which  was  enhanced  by  agricultural 
protectionism  and  state  subventions,  particularly  to  wheat  and  other  cereals.  Such 
                                                            
42 See Lains (2003b). 
43 See Pereira and Estácio (1968).  
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change was a consequence of higher levels of contraction of imports, due to higher 
levels of tariff protection and state intervention. But agrarian structural change was also 
related to the expansion of demand as a consequence of overall output growth and that 
was  particularly  important  for  animal  output.  The  role  of  demand  in  fostering 
agricultural output growth in Portugal is confirmed by showing that there was a positive 
correlation between long run output and price trends.
44 The observed changes in the 
agricultural sector compare favorably with what happened in the rest of the economy 
and in particular in the industrial sector.  
In fact, the structure of the Portuguese industry remained relatively stable in the period 
from 1930 to 1950 for which we have information shown in Table 12. There were of 
course some changes, as the share of chemicals, non-metallic products and basic metals 
expanded throughout the same period. Yet the fact that those sectors were relatively 
small, accounting for only 6.1 percent of total output in 1930 and 9.1 percent in 1950, 
implied that the overall impact was also small. 
Table 12 – Structure of output and labor productivity in Portugal, 1930-1950 
  Output shares  Labor productivity 
  1930  1940  1950  1958  1930  1940  1950  1958 
Agricult., Forest, Fishing  33.1  33.0  32.0  26.8  7,1  7,4  9,1  10,6 
Mining and Quarrying  0.4  0.7  0.6  0.6  9,3  11,1  11,2  12,3 
Manufacturing   24.6  23.8  25.4  28.8  20,0  18,0  19,2  23,8 
Food, bev, tobacco  5.4  4.5  3.9  4.0  40,1  22,4  22,6  31,6 
Textiles, clothes, footwear  6.8  6.2  6.7  7.0  11,4  10,3  12,5  15,8 
Wood, cork, furniture  4.3  3.3  3.3  2.7  29,2  18,6  16,2  15,5 
Paper, publishing, printing   0.9  1.0  1.0  1.6  25,1  25,8  24,6  33,3 
Chemicals, rubber,  petrol.   1.4  1.7  2.2  2.9  131,1  63,7  95,4  52,8 
 Non-metallic miner prods  0.8  1.1  1.5  2.0  26,5  23,4  26,7  29,5 
Basic metals, machinery  3.9  4.7  5.4  7.1  20,2  27,2  29,0  28,2 
Other   1.2  1.1  1.2  1.4  13,7  25,5  12,3  36,7 
Construction   1.8  2.6  3.6  4.7  4,0  6,8  10,3  11,8 
Electricity, Gas, Water   0.6  0.8  1.1  2.3  27,3  45,1  51,3  90,5 
Trade, Finance, Rents    16.3  17.0  17.0  17.5  30,7  29,4  29,8  32,3 
Transport, Communications  3.8  3.9  4.3  5.3  14,6  15,3  18,1  24,9 
Services  19.4  18.3  16.0  14.0  9,8  13,2  14,9  16,6 
GDP at factor cost  100  100  100  100  10,9  11,8  14,0  17,2 
Source: Computed from Batista et al. (1997). 
Table 12 also shows labor productivity levels across the Portuguese economy with the 
highest possible disaggregate level. Labor productivity in agriculture was clearly below 
that of manufacturing but it compared well to productivity in textiles and ‘other’ as well 
as in construction and services. We do not have disaggregated data on agrarian labor 
                                                            
44 See Reis (1993, chaps. 2 and 3) and Lains (2003b).  
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productivity, but the disparities across sectors were certainly large. In fact, data on land 
productivity by region for 1952-1956 show wide differences in the 270 departments 
(concelhos) ranging from 0.3 to 2.4 contos/hectare. The range of labor productivity at 
the 18 district level (distrito) is 1:2. This implies that labor in the agrarian sector of the 
top six districts, which account for 31 percent of total agrarian output, has productivity 
levels above the national average for manufacturing.
45  
If we take into account the fact that labor productivity in agriculture varied widely, as 
shown by the regional data, we may conclude that in some agrarian sectors productivity 
was above that of textiles, construction and services. This conclusion is confirmed by 
the  overall  picture  given  by  Caetano  (1961),  based  on  an  interpretation  of  the  first 
comprehensive industrial census for 1957-59 which states that Portugal’s industry was 
characterized by many units with what he terms an ‘anti-economical dimension’ and a 
very small coverage of the country.
46 The character of industrialization would change 
markedly in the following decade, as Portugal adhered to EFTA in 1959 and the country 
opened up.
47 
According to Aguiar and Martins’ (forthcoming) shift-share analysis, the agricultural 
sector contributed with 23.9 percent of total labor productivity growth during 1910-
1950, whereas industry contributed with 35.5 percent and services with 40.6 percent. In 
no other period during the twentieth century analyzed by the authors did agriculture 
contribute to productivity growth in such a way. More importantly, 85 percent of overall 
labor  productivity  growth  in  1910-1950  was  a  result  of  intra-sectorial  productivity 
growth and just the remaining 15 percent can be attributed to shifts of labor towards 
sectors with higher productivity or with productivity growing above the average. About 
1/3 of intra-sectorial growth is attributed again to changes within the agricultural sector. 
Labor  productivity  changes  in  the  industrial  sector  occurred  fundamentally  in 
construction  and  energy  (i.e.  electricity),  whereas  the  manufacturing  proper  sector 
lagged  behind.  Moreover,  the  observed productivity changes occurred  mainly  in the 
traditional sectors, namely, textiles and the food and wood industries. Building also 
                                                            
45 Pereira and Estácio (1968, pp. 23-24 and 51). 
46 See Caetano (1961, p. 931). See also Pintado (2002). 
47 After 1960, there was a clear change in the emphasis of economic policy favoring the industrial sector. 
See for example Moura (1973).  
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increased its domestic output share. Contrarily the capital intensive sectors had negative 
labor productivity growth rates. 
The short-run effects of protection in the interwar period were positive in the sense that 
the  Portuguese  economy  responded  and  higher  growth  was  achieved.  That  response 
implied an increase in the contribution of agriculture to domestic output. There was 
clearly a shift in the specialization of agriculture towards products with higher levels of 
factor productivity. In what the industrial sector was concerned, the changes favored 
what  we  may  term  as  traditional  sectors,  including  textiles,  foodstuffs  and  wooden 
products. The fact that such low key form of structural change led to a positive impact in 
Portugal’s  total  factor  productivity  growth  reflects  the  structure  of  the  domestic 
economy. On the demand side the fact was that there was still much scope for growth of 
the  consumption  of  comparatively  more  sophisticated  agrarian  products  with  higher 
levels  of  labor and  capital productivity.  On  the  supply side, it reflects the potential 
vantage point of investment in the agrarian sector, as factor productivity in agriculture 
could be higher than in some industrial branches. The mechanism which led to higher 
productivity levels in agriculture is peculiar to the Portuguese economy and presumably 
to the other peripheral European economies. It can be explained mainly by the relative 
backwardness of these countries. 
There  are  several  reasons  for  the  little  attention  devoted  to  the  performance  of  the 
Portuguese  economy  in  the  interwar  period.  Firstly,  although  contemporaries  were 
aware of improvements, it was only recently that yearly output indices for agriculture 
and industry have been computed for that period. Secondly, the interwar years were 
marked by high inflation, as well as high internal and external deficits, which have been 
too hastily related to economic decline. Thirdly, the evaluation of the performance of the 
economy in those decades has been blurred by the debate over the consequences of the 
advent of the Salazar’s regime as many authors assume that the policies imposed by the 
dictatorial regime were biased against growth. Finally, the good performance of the 
economy before 1950 has been less noticed because, despite such improvements as there 
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CONCLUSION 
Southern peripheral countries took only limited advantages from the expansion of the 
international economy in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The reasons for the 
lack  of  response  in  the  periphery  during  this  period  are  a  matter  of  dispute.  Some 
authors would stress the negative impact of protectionist policies followed by countries 
such  as  Portugal  and  Spain.  Yet,  the  countries  in  the  Balkan  region  also  did  not 
converge despite the fact that tariff protection there was introduced only latter on, during 
the last decade of the century, and even then in a mild form. Government may also have 
been responsible for diverting productive investment to excess expenditure and debt, but 
that would have been the case only in Portugal, Spain and Greece, as the other Balkan 
countries kept balanced accounts throughout the period between 1870 and 1914. Other 
structural factors, such as low literacy levels, were a common feature in these countries 
and that may have contributed to the poor performance of their economies.
48  
However, such a list of negative factors did not disappear after the War and in many 
cases they were aggravated. Protectionism was enhanced, the level of state intervention 
was increased and there was a sharp contraction everywhere in the levels of exports and 
imports  which  were  accompanied  in  many  countries  by  declining  terms  of  trade, 
particularly for agricultural exporters – as well as low levels of emigration. The fact that 
a country such as Portugal attained higher growth rates of GDP per capita and that, for 
the  first  time  in  many  decades,  managed  to  catch  up,  albeit  only  partially,  to  the 
European core implies that we need to investigate how growth was achieved in such 
presumably unfavorable circumstances.  
This paper shows that productivity gains were achieved by keeping resources in the 
agrarian sector, where labour and total factor productivity gains could be achieved, as 
well  as  moving  factors  to  construction,  services  and  some  of  the  more  traditional 
branches in manufacturing, such as foodstuffs, textiles and wood products, as well as the 
services sector. The fact that the gains obtained were associated to what can be termed 
as traditional sectors implies that the Portuguese economy, overall, did not transform 
itself in an important way.  
We conclude that specialization towards the domestic market led to structural changes 
in the economy that favored growth. Yet, this was possible thanks to the existence of 
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favorable  conditions  in  the  balance  of  payments  that  allowed  higher  levels  of 
investment. Such an outcome was peculiar to Portugal in the interwar period and thus 
should  not  be  extended  without  further  qualification  to  other  experiences  of  other 
countries and time periods. But it shows that peripheral countries can achieve higher 
growth rates within an unfavorable context in the international economy and that ‘good 
policies and efficient institutions are more important than openness’.
49  
The counterfactual that should emerge from the paper is not that protection is good for 
growth. We don not really know what would have happened in an open economy with 
buoyant external markets. And the experience of the golden age (1950-1973) tells us 
that  Portugal  obtained  large  benefits  from  an  expanding  international  economy. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the growth that occurred during the interwar period was 
not a necessary condition for the country to achieve the Abramovitzian minimum social 
and economic capabilities in order to take full benefits of post World War II economic 
boom. 
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